Room for Religion in Public Discourse by TAN, Seow Hon
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Law School of Law
4-2008
Room for Religion in Public Discourse
Seow Hon TAN
Singapore Management University, seowhontan@smu.edu.sg
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research
Part of the Religion Law Commons
This News Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Law by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore
Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
TAN, Seow Hon. Room for Religion in Public Discourse. (2008). Today. 14-14. Research Collection School Of Law.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research/1086
Room for religion in public discourse: Why, in some situations, it makes sense to let religious citizens 
speak up on their convictions 
Tan Seow Hon  1114 words 
Published in TODAY (Singapore), 7 April 2011, 16 
At the end of a philosophy of law course that I taught, a student told me that his only regret was that 
“religion was kept on the sidelines”. He felt it could add something to the topics discussed. But he 
understood that it might lead to “irresolvable differences and controversy”. 
The idea that religion is an ultra-sensitive topic best avoided is ingrained in the Singaporean mindset. 
When religious citizens engage in public discourse that leads to public decisions and laws, others fear 
they make arguments supportable only by religious worldviews. Intractable debates result. 
Government might end up pronouncing on the rightness of one religious view over another. 
Moreover, public decisions and laws affect everyone in our multi-religious democracy. If they are 
supportable only by religious views, are not the religious imposing their views on the rest of society 
which may not share such views? 
When several persons from the same church won executive committee seats at the annual general 
meeting of the Association of Women for Action and Research (Aware) in 2009 and were opposed to 
the manner Aware conducted its sexuality education in schools, the public were concerned about 
the appropriate role of religious persons and groups. 
This concern also arose in the 2007 debate over whether section 377A of the Penal Code, which 
prohibits acts of gross indecency between males, should be repealed. Some say the prohibition is 
justifiable only on religious grounds. 
The Government’s approach is that of sensitivity, neutrality and consultation. The pronouncement of 
our Constitutional Commission in 1966 that Singapore is a “democratic secular state” is affirmed in 
the Declaration of Religious Harmony. The Government recognises the vitality of religious harmony 
in our multi-religious nation. 
Its call for sensitivity is bolstered by laws such as the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act and 
sections 298 and 298A of the Penal Code. 
These laws regulate, among other things, acts that cause feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will 
between different religious groups. 
The secular nature of the state means laws and policies are neither dictated by the views of any 
religious group nor justified by religious authority. Religion, however, often contributes to the mores 
of societies. As such, the Government receives the views of religious groups as interested parties, for 
example, in relation to the integrated resorts. 
 
HOW SHOULD RELIGION FEATURE IN PUBLIC DISCOURSE? 
Given our commitment to democracy, pluralism and the secular nature of our state, what argument 
is legitimate in public discourse which leads to laws and decisions that affect everyone? 
 
First, treating a particular religion as authoritative without consideration of anything else is out. 
Second, excluding religious persons cuts off the majority of Singaporeans who regard themselves as 
religious. Unless a state is anti-religion, why should having a religion bar one from public discourse? 
Third, denying someone the right to participate in public discourse if she is religiously motivated or 
influenced does not make sense. We reasonably expect people to treat their religions more seriously 
than hobbies. 
Furthermore, as Columbia Law School professor Kent Greenawalt suggests, it is hard to determine 
how a religious person would decide an issue if she only refers to publicly accessible reasons and 
personal non-religious bases and detaches her religious bases from the analysis. 
We might think those who are religiously motivated are unlikely to change their minds on an issue, 
whereas those who begin with personal non-religious motivations are open to reason. Prof 
Greenawalt notes that this distinction is “overblown”, as the latter might not be open to arguments 
to the contrary while the former might be. 
The late Harvard professor John Rawls suggests we refrain from deciding basic questions of justice 
by comprehensive doctrines of truth, which include conceptions of what is of value in human life. 
Examples include religious worldviews and secular doctrines such as John Mill’s ideal of individuality. 
Instead, rely on “public reason”. Offer fair terms of cooperation to others. Propose what is most 
reasonable to us. We must also think the proposed terms are at least reasonable for others as free 
and equal citizens to accept. 
But how does one know what is “reasonable” or “fair” without reference to standards of truth in 
comprehensive doctrines? Oxford professor John Finnis thinks Prof Rawls’s approach results in basic 
questions being remitted to hunches, as one is not allowed to resolve them by reference to what is 
true. 
 
THE ABORTION EXAMPLE 
On whether laws should permit abortion, for example, Prof Rawls asserts that women who reject 
the claim that foetuses have a right to life from conception are not “unreasonable”. 
Prof Finnis suggests that medical science shows the difference between the unborn and the 
newborn to be no more and no less than the difference between being inside and outside the 
mother’s body. He thinks it is arbitrary to deny the unborn the rights of free and equal citizens — 
rights accorded to newborns — by allowing women to abort them. Following from Prof Finnis’s view, 
it is not true that the only reasons for restrictive abortion laws are religious in nature. 
Prof Greenawalt, on the other hand, thinks that science can trace the growth of the unborn, but 
does not resolve its moral status. Permissive abortion laws settle the metaphysical question of the 
moral status of the unborn by deciding that an unborn is not worthy of the same protection as a 
newborn. Such metaphysical questions are in fact answered differently by different religious and 
non-religious convictions, by reference to reasons that are not necessarily publicly accessible. 
Prof Greenawalt thinks that if publicly accessible reasons and shared premises can’t resolve such 
issues, the religious and the non-religious are both reaching beyond such grounds in law-making. All 
may rely upon their convictions while committed to a secular democracy, although realistically, laws 
would be changed only with substantial support. 
 Allowing religious citizens to participate according to their religious convictions in such situations 
may be as sensible as allowing non-religious citizens to participate according to their personal 
convictions. After all, what grounds democracy and the very belief that we should not impose on 
others is a metaphysical belief in equal moral worth. 
Religious or not, we may share these premises, which may well be quite beyond the realm of 
publicly accessible reasons. 
 
Dr Tan Seow Hon is an associate professor of law at the Singapore Management University. She was 
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Reporting religion: Dilemmas of public discourse. 
